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Section 622 of the Dodd-Frank Act: Self-Defeating 
Liability Concentration Limits 
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent financial crisis has demonstrated that, under “unusual 
and exigent circumstance,” the Federal Reserve Board (“Fed”) is willing 
to allow mergers that are unlikely to be approved during normal times.1  
At the height of the crisis, the Fed was not only playing the role of an 
impartial regulator but also that of a matchmaker by actively arranging 
mergers among the troubled financial institutions.2  As a consequence, 
the banks that were too-big-to-fail (“TBTF”) got even bigger after the 
crisis:3 the assets of the five largest banks as a share of GDP increased 
from 43% in 2006 to 56% in 2011.4 
A TBTF firm is “one whose size, complexity, interconnectedness, 
and critical functions are such that, should the firm go unexpectedly into 
liquidation, the rest of the financial system and the economy would face 
1. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Statement Regarding the
Application and Notices by Wells Fargo & Company to Acquire Wachovia Corporation and 
Wachovia’s Subsidiary Banks and Nonbanking Companies 2 (Oct. 21, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20081021a1.pdf. 
2. See ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 456 
(2009)  (describing how Timothy Geithner, then the president of the FRB New York, tried to 
arrange bank mergers with Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley who were in danger of 
failing). 
3. In contrast to their U.S. counterparts, the European banks that received government
aid did not increase their market share.  Gert-Jan Koopman, Stability and Competition in EU 
Banking during the Financial Crisis: The Role of State Aid and Control, 7 COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L 17 (2011).  It has been argued that what made the difference was the active 
involvement of the EU competition authority, who took actions against policies that would 
favor local companies of the member states.  Albert A. Foer & Don Allen Resnikoff, 
Competition Policy and “Too Big” Banks in the European Union and the United States, 59 
ANTITRUST BULL. 11–19 (2014).  This suggests that competition policy could play a larger 
role in addressing the TBTF problem.  A formal analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of 
this Note.  For a discussion, see Xavier Vives, Competition and Stability in Banking (IESE 
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 852, 2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1593613. 
4. David J. Lynch, Big Banks: Now Even Too Bigger To Fail, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 23–29, 2012, at 33, 33. 
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severe, adverse consequences.”5  However, providing assistance to and 
preventing the collapse of a TBTF firm during a financial crisis creates 
several long term problems for the economy.6  First, it generates a moral 
hazard problem where TBTF firms “take more risk than desirable” 
expecting to receive assistance “if their bets go bad.”7  Second, it creates 
an uneven playing field between large and small firms.8  Third, TBTF 
firms can themselves become risks to financial stability.9 
Conceptually, there are three different ways to resolve the TBTF 
problem: (1) prevent banks from becoming too big; (2) prevent big banks 
from failing; and (3) allow big banks to fail in an orderly fashion.10  The 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(“Dodd-Frank”) adopted all three of the above approaches.11  Section 
622, as part of the first line of defense in Dodd-Frank against the TBTF 
problem, requires that the liabilities of a financial company after a merger 
should not exceed 10% of the liabilities of all financial companies in the 
United States.12 
Like many other Dodd-Frank provisions, section 622 has been 
criticized on several different grounds.13  It has been argued that the 
concentration limit puts U.S. financial companies at a competitive 
disadvantage against foreign financial institutions.14  Others have 
5. Causes of the Recent Financial and Economic Crisis: Testimony Before the Fin.
Crisis Inquiry Comm’n 20 (Sept. 2, 2010) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of 
the Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20100902a.htm. 
6. Id.
7. Id. at 20–21.
8. Id. at 21.
9. Id.
10. There is wide-ranging disagreement on whether all (or any) of the three approaches
need to be taken.  See H. Rodgin Cohen, Preventing the Fire Next Time: Too Big To Fail, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 1717, 1737–38 (2011–2012) (arguing that empirical evidence does not support 
the premise that larger banks are more risky); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 
GEO. L.J. 435, 489 (2010–2011) (questioning whether Orderly Liquidation process under 
Dodd-Frank will be better able to contain the systemic risk than Chapter 11 process). 
11. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852 (2012).  For a general discussion of Dodd-Frank and TBTF problem, 
see Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Dodd-Frank Act: TARP Bailout Backlash and Too Big To 
Fail, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 69 (2011). 
12. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852.
13. See generally VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-
FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE (2011); DAVID A. SKEEL, THE
NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED)
CONSEQUENCES (2011). 
14. See, e.g., Financial Regulatory Reform: The International Context: Hearing Before
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questioned whether it is desirable to maintain a hard-and-fast rule like the 
10% limit on liability concentration.15  This Note argues that the strongest 
criticism, however, comes from the observation that section 622 is not 
entirely consistent with other Dodd-Frank provisions.  Furthermore, this 
Note points out that there are other clauses in Dodd-Frank that can be 
used to block the types of mergers that threaten the stability of the 
financial system.  What distinguishes section 622 is that it is a bright-line 
rule that limits the Fed’s discretionary power.  This Note shows, however, 
that this provision allows exceptions that give discretion back to the Fed, 
and hence, defeat the purpose of the legislation. 
Although unsuccessful, several attempts have been made to 
correct the deficiencies inherent in section 622.  Before the passage of the 
final bill, Senators Sherrod Brown and Ted Kaufman proposed an 
amendment (“Brown-Kaufman Amendment”) containing a provision that 
addressed this problem by eliminating the Fed’s discretion.16  The 
Brown-Kaufman Amendment ultimately failed to be adopted.17  In 2012, 
the amendment was modified and reintroduced as the SAFE Banking 
Act.18  Although this bill also was not enacted, it contained a section 
similar to section 622, but without the crippling exceptions. 
This Note proceeds as follows.  Part II provides the background 
with a brief legislative history behind section 622 and its relation to the 
existing 10% deposit cap.19  Part III examines the main elements of 
section 622 and its relation to other Dodd-Frank provisions.20  Part IV 
examines two minor issues regarding section 622: economies of scale and 
the rigid 10% cap.21  Part V discusses the problematic exceptions allowed 
and the two failed attempts to amend section 622—the Brown-Kaufman 
Amendment and the SAFE Banking Act.22  A summary and a conclusion 
follow in Part VI.23 
the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 112th Cong. 161 (2011) [hereinafter Scott] (statement of Hal S. 
Scott, Professor, Harvard Law School). 
15. See ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 13, at 197.
16. S. Amend. 3733, 111th Cong. (2010).
17. 156 CONG. REC. S3352 (daily ed. May 6, 2010).
18. Safe Accountable Fair, and Efficient Banking Act, H.R. 5714, 112th Cong. (2012).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part VI.
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II. BACKGROUND
A proper understanding of section 622—or any statute, for that 
matter—requires context.  For this purpose, a brief legislative history is 
provided for necessary background.  Following is a discussion of the 
relation of Section 622 to the existing nationwide deposit cap. 
A. Legislative History
Dodd-Frank was the U.S. government’s response to the financial 
crisis of 2008.  It was first proposed by the Obama Administration 
(“Administration”) in June 2009.24  A version of the bill passed the House 
on December 11, 2009,25 and passed the Senate, with amendment, on 
May 20, 2010.26  A conference committee was convened to resolve the 
differences, and the final bill passed both houses by July 15, 2010.27  The 
bill was signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010.28 
Section 622 was neither in the House bill nor in the 
Administration’s original proposal—instead, it was added later by the 
Administration, along with the Volcker Rule, after the bill was passed by 
the House.29  It is not exactly clear how section 622 made its way into the 
bill.  One story attributes its genesis to President Obama’s outrage at the 
news that Wall Street executives were getting larger year-end bonuses in 
2009 than they had in 2007.30  The White House formally announced the 
new proposal on January 21, 2010.31 
24. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, U.S. Treasury Dep’t Releases Fin.
Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/20096171052487309.aspx (proposing a “new foundation for financial 
regulation and supervision”). 
25. 155 CONG. REC. H14804 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009).
26. 156 CONG. REC. S4078 (daily ed. May 20, 2010).
27. 156 CONG. REC. S5933 (daily ed. July 15, 2010).
28. Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 3 (July 21, 2010). 
29. 156 CONG. REC. S2377 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 2010).
30. Michael Hirsh, Paul Volcker: First He Challenged Obama, Then He Changed Wall
Street, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/12/paul-volcker-first-he-challenged-
obama-then-he-changed-wall-street/282259/. 
31. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Calls for New Restrictions on
Size and Scope of Financial Institutions to Rein in Excesses and Protect Taxpayers (Jan. 21, 
2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-calls-new-restrictions-
size-and-scope-financial-institutions-rein-e. 
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Section 622 did not get significant attention from Congress before 
it was enacted.  Its insignificant impression is especially apparent when 
compared with the Volcker Rule.  For example, while the Senate 
conference report does not mention section 622 at all, it mentions section 
619’s Volcker Rule seventy-one times.32  One reason for this might be 
that the proposed legislation looked similar to the existing nationwide 
10% deposit limit.33  In fact, this is how the Administration marketed 
section 622 at the Senate hearing—as a provision designed to 
“supplement” the existing deposit cap.34  There were, however, 
significant differences between the two. 
B. Relation to the Riegle-Neal Act
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act (“Riegle-Neal Act”) was signed into law by President Clinton on 
September 29, 1994.35  As the title suggests, the legislation was 
introduced to eliminate then existing restrictions on interstate 
branching.36  To address the concern about excessive concentration of the 
banking industry, the Riegle-Neal Act prohibited banks from controlling 
more than 30% of statewide deposits or 10% of nationwide deposits after 
a merger.37 
Despite the apparent similarity, there are two important 
differences between section 622 and the deposit cap under the Riegle-
Neal Act.  First, section 622 is not limited to regulating deposits—it 
regulates total liabilities.38  This has important consequences in 
32. See 156 CONG. REC. S5870–933 (daily ed. July 15, 2010).  In the House report,
section 622 is not mentioned and section 619 or the Volcker Rule is mentioned eight times. 
See Cong. Rec. H5233–61 (daily ed. June 30, 2010). 
33. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (“Riegle-Neal
Act”) § 101(a), 12 U.S.C. §1842(d) (2012). 
34. Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank Holding
Companies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 
4–5 (2010) (statement of Neal S. Wolin, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury). 
35. Remarks on Signing the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act of 1994, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1896 (Sept. 29, 1994). 
36. For the history of interstate banking and the significance of Riegle-Neal Act, see
LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE 
ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 633–62 (4th ed. 2011). 
37. Riegle-Neal Act § 101(a), 12 U.S.C. §1842(d).
38. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852 (2012). 
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controlling the systemic risk that results from bank failures.  Given the 
deposit insurance offered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”), having a large amount of deposits does not necessarily make a 
bank vulnerable to a bank run.39  Focusing on liabilities rather than just 
deposits was, therefore, a significant change. 
Second, section 622 covers more institutions than the Riegle-Neal 
Act.  The 10% deposit cap only applies to a “bank” under the Bank 
Holding Company Act (“BHC Act”).40  This definition of a bank excludes 
several bank-like institutions such as savings and loan associations, 
savings banks, and industrial loan companies.41  During the financial 
crisis, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch.42  Although their 
combined deposit share would reach 11.9%, the 10% cap did not apply 
because the acquired companies were a savings bank and an industrial 
loan company.43  Section 622 closed this “loophole” by expanding the 
institutions covered.44 
C. Implementation of Section 622
Section 622 provided that the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (“FSOC”) conduct a study45 and that the Fed issue regulations in 
accordance with FSOC’s recommendations.46  The section specifically 
required that the FSOC study examine the effects of the concentration 
39. A bank with a large amount of uninsured deposits—those exceeding the current limit
$250,000—could, however, be subject to a bank run.  See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond & Philip 
H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 412 (1983)
(showing that, without deposit insurance, a bank run may arise from self-fulfilling panics
among rational depositors).
40. Bank Holding Company Act (“BHC Act”) § 2(c) (1956) (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(c) (2012)).
41. Id.
42. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Approval of Proposal by Bank of America to
Acquire Merrill Lynch 1 (November 26, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/20081126a.htm. 
43. Id. at 2, n.6.
44. See infra Section III.A.1.
45. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(e) (2012) (Although § 622 is codified in its entirety at 12 U.S.C. § 
1852, § 622 does not have the matching subsections of § 1852.  This is because § 622 is 
structured so that it adds a new section to the existing BHA Act.  This Note adopts the 
convention that, whenever it cites a subsection of § 1852, it parallel cites Dodd-Frank § 622 
in order to show its origin, even though, strictly speaking, there is no matching subsection in 
§ 622).
46. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852 (d).
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limits in four particular areas: (1) financial stability; (2) moral hazard in 
the financial system; (3) efficiency and competitiveness of U.S. financial 
firms and financial markets; and (4) cost and availability of credit and 
other financial services.47 
The FSOC study concluded that the concentration limit will 
reduce the risk to the U.S. financial system and, in the long run, enhance 
the competitiveness of U.S. financial firms.48  The impact on moral 
hazard and the availability of credit were expected to be neutral.49  FSOC 
made three recommendations: (1) measure liabilities of financial 
companies not subject to consolidated risk-based capital rules using the 
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) or other 
applicable accounting standards; (2) use a two-year average to calculate 
aggregate financial sector liabilities and publish annually by July 1 the 
current aggregate financial sector liabilities applicable to the period of 
July 1 through June 30 of the following year; and (3) extend the “failing 
bank exception” to apply to the acquisition of any type of insured 
depository institution currently in default or in danger of default.50  On 
May 15, 2014, the Fed announced a proposed rule that reflected FSOC’s 
recommendations.51 
III. LIABILITY CONCENTRATION LIMITS ON LARGE FINANCIAL
COMPANIES 
Effective January 1, 2015, the Fed approved a final rule that 
implemented section 622 of Dodd-Frank.52  The rule prohibits “covered 
acquisitions” that result in a financial company having consolidated 
liabilities greater than 10% of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all 
financial companies in the United States.53  A covered acquisition is a 
47. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(e)(1)(A).
48. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING
CONCENTRATION LIMITS ON LARGE FINANCIAL COMPANIES 4 (2011) [hereinafter COUNCIL 
STUDY], 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Study%20on%20Concentration%20Limits%
20on%20Large%20Firms%2001-17-11.pdf. 
49. Id.
50. Id. at 16–22.
51. Concentration Limits on Large Financial Companies, 79 Fed. Reg. 27801 (proposed
May 15, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 251). 
52. Concentration Limit (Regulation XX), 12 C.F.R. pt. 251 (2015).
53. 12 C.F.R. §§ 251.2(f), 253(a).
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transaction in which a company: (1) merges or consolidates with; (2) 
acquires all or substantially all of the assets of; or (3) otherwise acquires 
control of another company.54  This does not prevent, for example, 
increasing liabilities in excess of the cap through internal, organic 
growth.55  The elements of section 622 and its relation to other Dodd-
Frank provisions are discussed in some detail below. 
A. Elements of Section 622
Section 622 prohibits a “financial company” from holding 
“liabilities” greater than 10% of the liabilities of all financial companies 
in the United States subject to certain exceptions.  The meaning of 
financial company and liabilities as well as the three exceptions allowed 
are examined in turn. 
1. Financial Company
A “financial company” is (1) an insured depository institution; 
(2) a bank holding company (“BHC”); (3) a savings and loan holding
company; (4) a company that controls an insured depository institution;
(5) a nonbank financial company supervised by the Fed;56 or (6) a foreign
bank or company that is treated as a BHC for the purposes of the BHC
Act.57  Thus, this definition includes commercial or industrial firms that
control an insured depository institution (e.g., an industrial loan company
or limited-purpose credit card bank).58  On the other hand, the definition
excludes credit unions as well as insurance or securities companies that
are not affiliated with an insured depository institution unless the
company is a nonbank financial company supervised by the Fed.59
54. Id.
55. COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 48, at 9.  Also, acquisitions in the ordinary course of
collecting a debt or in a fiduciary capacity in good faith are not covered.  12 C.F.R. §§
251.2(f)(1), (f)(2). 
56. Section 113 of Dodd-Frank provides that the FSOC may require that a nonbank
financial company be subject to the supervision by the Fed if the FSOC demines that the 
company could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.  Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012). 
57. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852.  A foreign company is treated as a bank holding
company if it, or one of its subsidiaries, is a foreign bank or has a commercial lending 
subsidiary in the U.S.  12 U.S.C. § 3106 (2012). 
58. COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 48, at 5–6.
59. Id. at 6.
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2. Liabilities
“Liabilities” are computed by subtracting total regulatory 
capital60 from total risk-weighted assets.61  For foreign financial 
companies, liabilities include only those of their U.S. operations.62  The 
aggregate liabilities of all financial companies are calculated as the 
average of the year-end liabilities for the preceding two calendar years.63  
This measure is then used from July 1 of each year until June 30 of the 
following year.64  For the first period between July 1, 2015, and June 30, 
2016, the aggregate liabilities are equal to the year-end liabilities figure 
as of December 31, 2014.65 
Section 622 requires that the risk-weighted assets be adjusted to 
reflect exposures that are deducted from regulatory capital.66  The Fed set 
the adjustment formula in its final rule.67  For a U.S. company subject to 
applicable risk-based capital rules, the liabilities are equal to: (1) total 
risk-weighted assets; plus (2) the amount of assets deducted from the 
regulatory capital, times a “multiplier;” minus (3) total regulatory capital 
of the company.68  The “multiplier” is the inverse of the company’s total 
risk-based capital ratio minus one.69 
This seemingly complicated adjustment is necessary because, by 
construction, certain intangible assets like goodwill are deducted—from 
both capital and assets—before risk-based capital ratios are calculated.70  
60. Total regulatory capital is defined as the sum of (1) common equity tier 1 capital; (2)
additional tier 1 capital; and (3) tier 2 capital.  12 C.F.R. § 217.2. 
61. For a large BHC with total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $250 billion,
total risk-weighted assets are defined as: (1) the sum of (i) credit-risk-weighted assets; (ii) 
credit valuation adjustment risk-weighted assets; (iii) risk-weighted assets for operational 
risk; and (iv) advanced market risk-weighted assets, if applicable; minus (2) excess eligible 
credit reserves not included in the BHC’s tier 2 capital.  12 C.F.R. §§ 217.2, 217.100(b). 
62. 12 C.F.R. § 251.3(d).
63. 12 C.F.R. § 251.3(a)(2).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(3)(A)(i), (B)(i) (2012). 
67. 12 C.F.R. § 251.3(c).
68. Id.  When a company is not subject to risk-based capital rules, liabilities are
calculated using U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) or other accounting 
standard approved by the Fed.  12 C.F.R. §§ 251.2(a), 251.3(e). 
69. 12 C.F.R. § 251.3(c).
70. Concentration Limits on Large Financial Companies, 79 Fed. Reg. 27801, 27803
(proposed May 15, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 251). 
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The effect of this deduction is to require companies to hold a dollar of 
capital against each dollar of such assets.71  The adjustment is thus 
designed to add these deducted assets back—after converting them into 
their risk-weighted-asset equivalents by properly inflating them.72 
On July 1, 2015, the Fed announced that, as of December 31, 
2014, the aggregate financial sector liabilities were $21.6 trillion.73  The 
10% concentration limit for the year beginning July 1, 2014, is therefore 
set at $2.16 trillion.  This amount does not seem particularly restrictive 
because it would only affect the largest financial companies in the 
country.  For example, it would prohibit a merger between any pair of the 
four largest BHCs: JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, and 
Wells Fargo.74  It would also block a merger between Bank of America 
and MetLife or any combination of JPMorgan Chase with MetLife, 
Prudential Financial, GE Capital, or Goldman Sachs.75 
3. Exceptions
Three exceptions to the liability concentration limit are allowed: 
acquisition of a depository institution (1) “in default or in danger of 
71. Id.
72. Id.  A simple numerical example will clarify this procedure.  Suppose that the only
deducted asset is goodwill worth $2 billion.  Assume also that the total risk weighted assets 
are $100 billion and the regulatory capital is $8 billion.  The company’s capital ratio is thus 
8%.  How much assets should be added for a proper adjustment?  Adding $2 billion is surely 
not enough because it would require only additional $160 million (= $2 billion x 0.08) of 
capital.  The right amount for the adjustment in this case is $2 billion x 1/0.08 = $25 billion.  
To confirm, consider having additional risk weighed assets worth $25 billion.  Given that the 
capital ratio is 8%, the company would need additional capital worth $25 billion x 0.08 = $2 
billion in order to keep the capital ratio constant.  When the goodwill is added back to assets, 
it has to be added back to capital as well.  Therefore, the capital needs to be adjusted upward 
as well by $2 billion.  But this means that total liabilities—total risk-weighted assets minus 
capital—now becomes $100 billion + $25 billion – ($8 billion + $2 billion) = $115 billion.  It 
is straightforward to verify that applying the formula delivers exactly the same result: $100 
billion + $2 billion x (1/0.08 – 1) – $8 billion = $115 billion. 
73. Press Release, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board
Releases First Determination of the Aggregate Consolidated Liabilities of All Financial 
Companies in Accordance with Section 622 of the Dodd-Frank Act (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20150701a.htm. 
74. COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 48, at 8.
75. As of December 31, 2014, the ten largest financial companies in terms of their
liabilities were: JPMorgan Chase ($1.71 trillion), Bank of America ($1.40 trillion), Citigroup 
($1.28 trillion), Wells Fargo ($1.21 trillion), MetLife ($0.83 trillion), Prudential Financial 
($0.72 trillion), GE Capital ($0.51 trillion), Goldman Sachs ($0.50 trillion), Morgan Stanley 
($0.42 trillion), and AIG ($0.41 trillion).  The liability figures were computed by the author 
from each company’s Form 10-K for year 2014. 
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default; (2) with respect to which assistance is provided by the 
[FDIC] . . . ; or (3) that would result in a de minimis increase in the 
liabilities of the merged [financial] company.”76 
First, the acquisition of an insured depository institution that is in 
default or in danger of default may be allowed despite the concentration 
limit (“failing bank exception”).77  Whether an institution is in default or 
in danger of default is determined by its appropriate federal banking 
regulator in consultation with the Fed.78  Second, an exception may be 
made for an acquisition for which the FDIC provides assistance (“FDIC 
assisted acquisition”).79  The law allows the FDIC to provide such 
assistance to prevent a default, to restore a bank in default to normal 
operation, or to mitigate the risk to the FDIC under severe financial 
conditions that threaten the stability of depository institutions.80  Third, 
de minimis increases in liabilities are allowed.81  An increase in liabilities 
is de minimis if it does not exceed $2 billion.82 
These exceptions are likely motivated by cost-effectiveness 
concerns.  The benefit from regulating de minimis acquisitions, for 
example, will mostly be outweighed by the cost to the merging banks as 
well as to the regulator.  Similarly, the first two exceptions could be 
justified by the fact that, in many cases, it is more costly to liquidate a 
bank than to have it acquired by a healthy bank. 
But this ex post efficiency—the notion that a merger could be 
cheaper than liquidation after a bank fails—does not guarantee overall 
efficiency.  Knowing that a troubled bank can be acquired by another 
bank, banks will have less incentive to run their businesses prudently.  In 
other words, allowing mergers for failing banks will create ex ante 
inefficiency that could outweigh any ex post efficiency gains.  In fact, this 
is what is at the heart of the TBTF problem—although bailouts may be 
the most cost-efficient way of resolving failing banks, they also make 
banks more likely to fail in the first place.  The implications of these 
76. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c) (2012). 
77. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c)(1).
78. 12 C.F.R. § 251.4(a)(1) (2015).
79. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c)(2).
80. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1).
81. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c)(3).
82. 12 C.F.R. § 251.4(a)(3).
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exceptions are discussed in detail in Part V.83 
B. Relation to Sections 604, 163, and 121.
There are other Dodd-Frank provisions that regulate mergers that 
threaten the stability of the financial system.  Section 604 addresses 
mergers by a depository institution or those involving a BHC,84 while 
section 163 deals with merger involving systemically significant nonbank 
financial companies.85  With a supermajority vote of FSOC, section 121 
gives the Fed comprehensive authority to regulate the activities—
including mergers and acquisitions—of systemically important financial 
institutions (“SIFIs”).86 
The Bank Merger Act provides that an insured depository 
institution must get the approval of its federal agency87 in order to merge 
with, or acquire the assets of any other insured depository institution.88  
The BHC Act, on the other hand, requires that a merger or acquisition 
that involves a BHC must be approved by the Fed.89  Section 604 of 
83. See infra Part V.
84. Dodd-Frank § 604(d), (e)(1), (f), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(c), 1843(j)(2)(A), 1828(c)(5).
85. Dodd-Frank § 163, 12 U.S.C. § 5363.
86. Dodd-Frank § 121, 12 U.S.C. § 5331.  Dodd-Frank §§ 165 and 166 imposed
enhanced supervision and prudential standards for BHCs with total consolidated assets greater 
than or equal to $50 billion and the nonbank financial companies designated by the FSOC—
collectively called Systemically Important Financial Institutions.  Dodd-Frank §§ 165, 166, 
12 U.S.C. §§ 5365, 5366. 
87. This is the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency for a national bank or a federal
savings association, the Fed for a state member bank, and the FDIC for a state nonmember 
insured bank or a state savings association.  Bank Merger Act, Pub. L. No. 89-356, 64 Stat. 
892 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2) (2012) (amending Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act §18(c)(2)). 
88. Id.  More precisely, this requires the approval by the agency that will regulate the
resulting entity.  Id. 
89. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. 1842(a) (2012).  More specifically, the Fed’s 
approval is required: 
(1) for any action to be taken that causes any company to become a bank
holding company; (2) for any action to be taken that causes a bank to
become a subsidiary of a bank holding company; (3) any bank holding
company to acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting
shares of any bank if, after such acquisition, such company will directly
or indirectly own or control more than 5 per centum of the voting shares
of such bank; (4) for any bank holding company or subsidiary thereof,
other than a bank, to acquire all or substantially all of the assets of a bank;
or (5) for any bank holding company to merge or consolidate with any
other bank holding company.
Id. 
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Dodd-Frank provides that the responsible agency—and the Fed, in case 
of a merger involving a BHC—should consider the “risk to the stability 
of the United States banking or financial system” in determining whether 
to approve or deny a proposed merger.90 
Section 163 of Dodd Frank provides that a systemically 
significant nonbank financial company is treated as a BHC for the 
purpose of mergers and acquisitions approval.91  The same section also 
requires that SIFIs receive the Fed’s approval prior to acquiring 
ownership or control of any voting shares of a company that: (1) is 
engaged in activities that are financial in nature;92 and (2) has assets of 
$10 billion or more.93 
Section 121 of Dodd Frank provides that, when a SIFI is deemed 
to pose a “grave threat”94 to the stability of the U.S. financial system, the 
Fed may take “mitigatory” actions with a vote of two-thirds or more of 
FSOC.95  This is a comprehensive authority that allows (1) limiting 
mergers and acquisitions involving the SIFI; (2) restricting product 
offerings; (3) requiring termination of certain activities; (4) imposing 
conditions on activities; and (5) ordering divestiture of assets or off-
balance-sheet items if necessary.96 
In terms of regulating mergers and acquisitions, sections 604, 
163, and 121 cover most of the transactions that fall under section 622.97  
There is, however, a fundamental difference: section 622 prohibits such 
mergers and acquisitions as a rule while sections 604, 163, and 121 
90. Dodd-Frank § 604(d), (e)(1), (f), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(c), 1843(j)(2)(A), 1828(c)(5).
91. Dodd-Frank § 163(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5363(a).
92. Those are activities that are: (1) financial in nature; (2) incidental to such financial
activity; and (3) complementary to a financial activity.  Financial Services Modernization Act 
of 1999 (Graham-Leach-Bliley Act), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2012). 
93. Dodd-Frank § 163(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5363(b).
94. For the purpose of determining whether a company poses a “grave threat,” the Fed
and the FSOC must consider the same factors used to designate a SIFI.  Dodd-Frank § 121(c), 
12 U.S.C. § 5331(c).  The factors include, among other things, the leverage, off-balance-sheet 
exposures, nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, and mix of the 
activities of the company.  Dodd-Frank § 113(a)–(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)–(b). 
95. Dodd-Frank § 121(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5331(a).
96. Id.
97. An exception will be a bank acquiring the assets of a non-depository institution
through asset purchase.  Section 604 does not apply here because the target is not a depository 
institution.  Dodd-Frank § 604(f), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c).  Section 163 does not apply either 
because the bank does not “acquire ownership or control of any voting shares of” another 
company.  Dodd-Frank § 163(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5363(b).  Arguably, § 121 may still apply if the 
bank belongs to a SIFI.  Dodd-Frank § 121(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5331(a). 
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provide the federal regulatory agencies with a discretionary power to 
prohibit the merger.  As later discussion shows, however, this difference 
becomes moot once the exceptions to section 622 are taken into 
account.98 
IV. MINOR ISSUES
Section 622 raised several important issues, most of which were 
identified in the FSOC study.99  These are mostly “minor” issues in the 
sense that they may have some potentially adverse effects, but not to the 
extent that they undermine the purpose of the legislation.  Two such 
issues—economies of scale and the 10% threshold—are somewhat 
controversial. 
A. Economies of Scale
It has been argued that section 622 will prevent U.S. financial 
companies from realizing economies of scale through mergers.100  Given 
that the concentration limit affects only the largest of such mergers, the 
issue becomes whether economies of scale still exist for financial firms 
of very large size.101  But empirical evidence is mixed on this subject.102  
Although most research prior to 2000 found that economies of scale are 
exhausted at a modest size, some recent research has found that 
economies of scale exist for even the largest banks.103  Also worth noting 
98. See infra Part V.
99. COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 48, at 8–13.
100. Scott, supra note 14, at 161.
101. See COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 48, at 11 (discussing the effects of the concentration
limit on efficiency and competiveness of U.S. financial firms). 
102. Id. at n.22.
103. Id. at 11.  For a summary of research prior to 2000, see GROUP OF TEN, REP. ON 
CONSOLIDATION IN THE FIN. SECTOR 23 (2001), http://www.bis.org/publ/gten05.pdf 
(“Evidence suggests that only relatively small banks could generally become more efficient 
form an increase in size.”).  For studies that found economies of scale, see generally Guohua 
Feng & Apostolos Serletis, Efficiency, Technical Change, and Returns to Scale in Large US 
Banks: Panel Data Evidence from an Output Distance Function Satisfying Theoretical 
Regularity, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 127 (2010); Joseph P. Hughes, et. al., Are Scale Economies 
in Banking Elusive or Illusive? Evidence Obtained by Incorporating Capital Structure and 
Risk-Taking into Models of Bank Production, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 2169 (2001); David C. 
Wheelock & Paul W. Wilson, Do Large Banks Have Lower Costs? New Estimates of Returns 
to Scale for U.S. Banks, 44 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 171 (2012).  A related question is 
whether keeping the market competitive will increase innovation in the long run.  The 
empirical evidence on the link between market structure and innovation is mixed.  Wesley M. 
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is the fact that the estimated economies of scale may reflect the value of 
the implicit government guarantee due to the TBTF concern.104 
A related issue arises from the fact that section 622 treats 
domestic and foreign institutions asymmetrically.105  The concentration 
limit is based on global consolidated liabilities for U.S. financial 
companies, but only on the liabilities of the U.S. operations for foreign 
financial companies.106  Consequently, a large U.S. financial company 
may not acquire a U.S. financial company of substantial size, whereas a 
large foreign financial company with a relatively small U.S. presence 
may be able to acquire the same U.S. financial company because only its 
U.S. liabilities after the acquisition will count for the purpose of section 
622.107
This asymmetric treatment could potentially put U.S. financial 
companies at a competitive disadvantage.108  But the rationale behind the 
unequal treatment is not difficult to understand.  If foreign companies 
were measured based on their global liabilities instead of the liabilities of 
their U.S. operations, it would create a potentially more serious 
competitive concern.  It could put, for example, a foreign company with 
Cohen, Fifty Years of Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity and Performance, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECON. OF INNOVATION 129, 154 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg 
eds., 2010). 
104. See Loretta J. Mester, Scale Economies in Banking and Financial Regulatory
Reform, THE REGION 10, 12 (Sept. 2010) 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/pubs/region/10-09/scale2.pdf (noting that 
“[t]oo-big-to-fail considerations may be a source of some gains” associated with scale 
economies).  A simple numerical example will illustrate this issue.  Suppose that an empirical 
study found that the average cost of large banks was lower than that of medium-size banks by 
10%.  The same study also found that the average cost of “very large” banks was lower than 
that of medium-size banks by 15%.  Does this mean that economies of scale exist for the very 
large banks?  Not necessarily.  The problem is that some of the 15% cost advantage might be 
attributable to the implicit government guarantee enjoyed by the very large banks (for 
example, they may have been able to borrow at a lower rate because of the implicit 
government guarantee).  Suppose that 7% out of the 15% cost reduction was due to this 
implicit guarantee.  But this implies that, without the TBTF “premium,” the very large banks 
would have had only 8% cost advantage over medium-sized banks.  This means that, net of 
the TBTF effect, there were some diseconomies of scale between the large and the very large 
banks.  If the TBTF premium had been only 3% instead, the true cost reduction would have 
been 12%, and there would have been economies of scale between the large and the very large 
banks.  The issue will be resolved if there is a reliable estimate of the TBTF premium.  But 
such an estimate will be difficult—if not impossible—to obtain in practice. 
105. COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 48, at 12.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. (noting that the concentration limit could increase the number of large
foreign-based firms over U.S.-based firms). 
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a limited U.S. branch network at a competitive disadvantage against their 
much larger U.S. competitors.  FSOC recommended that the Fed monitor 
the “competitive dynamics” between U.S. and foreign firms and make 
recommendations to Congress if necessary.109  Given the subtlety of the 
issue, FSOC’s solution seems reasonable for now. 
B. The 10% Threshold
Criticism has been raised that the hard-and-fast rule, which 
requires a 10% limit on liabilities, could have unintended 
consequences.110  A large financial company, for example, could break 
into two companies and one portion could acquire another financial 
company.111  Although the two resulting companies will be separate 
corporate entities after the break-up, they may still inherit some of the 
systemic risk from their “former conglomerate.”112  In addition to this 
break-and-merge possibility, there are further cases where a strict 10% 
rule may not achieve its intended goal. 
Suppose, for example, that there are two large financial 
companies, Company A and Company B.  Both companies are 
considering an acquisition of a third firm, Company C.  Let us assume 
that A’s share of liabilities is 10% and both B and C have liability shares 
of 5%.  Under the 10% threshold rule, A cannot acquire C but B can.  If 
B is successful in its acquisition attempt, there will be two equal-sized 
firms in the market: A (10%) and the merged firm of B and C (a combined 
10%).  Without the 10% rule, however, A may merge with C resulting in 
two firms of unequal size: B (5%) and the merged firm of A and C (a 
combined 15%).  It seems unclear, however, which market configuration 
would be more desirable for the stability of the financial system. 
These examples seem to suggest that perhaps regulators should 
choose a sliding-scale approach over a rigid rule.  But this is not 
necessarily the best approach because the strict rule, requiring the 10% 
threshold, can provide a valuable strategic advantage.113  When a 
109. Id.
110. VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND
THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 197 (2010). 
111. Id. at 210 n.4.
112. Id.
113. Vives, supra note 3, at 38 n.43 (noting the interpretation of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) to reduce regulator discretion). 
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regulator becomes vulnerable to the industry’s demands, it may help the 
regulator if it gives up its discretion and follows a rigid rule instead.114  
This is an example of using a “commitment device,” which has been 
studied extensively in economics and political science.115  A classic 
example is Odysseus tying himself to the mast before hearing the Sirens’s 
song.116  As the following discussion shows, however, section 622 lacks 
such a commitment value because it contains exceptions that restore the 
regulator’s discretionary power.117 
V. PURPOSE-DEFEATING EXCEPTIONS
Section 622 has three exceptions.118  The de minimis exception, 
which allows an acquisition that does not increase liabilities by more than 
$2 billion, does not seem particularly harmful.  The other two exceptions 
from the 10% limit—the failing bank exception and the FDIC assisted 
acquisition—create serious loopholes that defeat the purpose of the 
legislation.119  The Brown-Kaufman Amendment and the SAFE Banking 
Act were notable—although unsuccessful—attempts to correct this 
problem. 
A. The Problem with the Exceptions
One of the exceptions provides that the Fed may allow a merger 
that would exceed the concentration limit if the merger involves an 
acquisition for which the FDIC is providing assistance.120  What is 
troubling about this exception is that such assistance is likely to occur 
114. Id.
115. Id. at 41–43.
116. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 214 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Farrar, Straus and Giroux
1998). 
117. See infra Part V.
118. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
622(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c) (2012). 
119. See Elizabeth F. Brown, The New Laws and Regulations for Financial
Conglomerates: Will They Better Manage the Risks Than the Previous Ones? 60 AM. U.L. 
REV. 1339, 1411 (2011) (arguing that these exceptions undermine the purpose of the rule by 
allowing too-big-to-fail banks to become even bigger); Roberta S. Karmel, An Orderly 
Liquidation Authority Is Not the Solution to Too-Big-To-Fail, BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. 
L. 1, 42 (2011) (arguing that failing firm exception “could make the concentration limit
superfluous”).
120. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c)(2).
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during a financial crisis, which is exactly when the Fed needs its 
commitment power most.  Given that the FDIC is bound by the law to 
choose the least costly way to resolve failed institutions,121 the logic 
behind the exception seems straightforward—if a merger that exceeds the 
liability concentration limit is the most efficient way to resolve a failed 
institution, the Fed should be able to allow it despite the concentration 
limit.  But pursuing ex post efficiency in this manner creates ex ante 
inefficiency—moral hazard of insured institutions—the very problem 
that Dodd-Frank is trying to address. 
The exception for a failing bank122 is equally, if not more, 
problematic.  Apparently, it is inspired by the “failing firm defense” of 
antitrust law, which under certain conditions permits an otherwise 
anticompetitive acquisition.123  Both permit an acquisition of a failing 
institution by another financially healthy institution even when such an 
acquisition would not be allowed under normal circumstances.  However, 
these two situations differ in two significant ways. 
First, the failing firm defense in antitrust law is subject to strict 
restrictions, while the failing bank exception is not.  The failing firm 
defense is “rarely invoked” and, when it is invoked, it is “rarely 
successful” because a strict legal standard is applied.124  There is no such 
standard in section 622 that limits the scope of the failing bank 
exception.125 
Second, the justification for the failing firm defense does not 
apply to the failing bank exception.  The rationale for the failing firm 
defense is that, compared with the alternative scenario in which the 
121. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 13(c)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (2012).
122. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852(c)(1).
123. For failing firm defense and its efficiency justification, see generally John E. Kwoka,
Jr. & Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Efficiencies, Failing Firms, and Alternatives to Merger: 
A Policy Synthesis, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 431 (1986). 
124. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. COMPETITION COMMITTEE, THE FAILING
FIRM DEFENCE 175 (2010), http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/45810821.pdf.  More 
specifically, the failing firm defense requires that: 
(1) the allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its
financial obligations in the near future; (2) it would not be able
to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Act; and (3) it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit
reasonable alternative offers that would keep its tangible and
intangible assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe
danger to competition than does the proposed merger.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 32 (2010). 
125. Dodd-Frank § 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852.
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failing firm exits the market, permitting the acquisition tends to increase 
industry output and hence lower prices.126  Acquisition of a failing firm, 
therefore, normally does not raise an antitrust concern.  Allowing an 
acquisition of a failing bank, however, increases the liabilities of the 
acquiring bank and hence makes it more vulnerable to the risk of 
default.127  In other words, such an acquisition tends to exacerbate, not 
mitigate, the TBTF concern. 
B. Failed Attempts: Brown-Kaufman Amendment and the Safe
Banking Act
The problems with section 622 did not go unnoticed.  Before the 
passage of Dodd-Frank, a group of senators proposed an amendment—
known as the Brown-Kaufman Amendment—in order to address some of 
the issues pointed out by critics including the concentration limit.128  On 
May 6, 2010, the Senate rejected the Brown-Kaufman Amendment in a 
sixty-one to thirty-three vote.129 
The Brown-Kaufman Amendment provided a concentration limit 
similar to the one in section 622.130  More specifically, it prohibited a 
BHC from holding non-deposit liabilities that exceed 2% of the annual 
GDP of the U.S.131  Additionally, the Brown-Kaufman Amendment 
prohibited nonbank financial companies supervised by the Fed from 
holding non-deposit liabilities that exceed 3% of the U.S. GDP.132  If a 
violation occurred, the Fed would have been required to implement a 
corrective action plan by ordering a sale or transfer of assets, terminating 
one or more activities, or imposing conditions on the activities.133 
126. Kwoka & Warren-Boulton, supra note 123, at 445.
127. An implicit assumption here is that the acquiring bank will maintain roughly the
same leverage ratio before and after the acquisition.  Although unlikely, if the acquisition is 
substantially financed by newly raised capital, the acquiring bank could become less 
vulnerable to the risk of default after the acquisition. 
128. 156 CONG. REC. S2765 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2010).
129. 156 CONG. REC. S3352 (daily ed. May 6, 2010).
130. S. Amend. 3733, 111th Cong. (2010).
131. Id. § 14(b)(1).  For 2014, the amount would be $347 billion.  U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
132. S. Amend. 3733 § 14(b)(1).  For 2014, the amount would be $520 billion.  U.S. DEP’T 
OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
133. S. Amend. 3733 § 14(c).
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The Brown-Kaufman Amendment also had clauses concerning 
the leverage ratios and the nationwide deposit cap.134  It required that, for 
bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies supervised by 
the Fed, Tier 1 capital must be at least 6% of both average consolidated 
total assets and all outstanding balance sheet liabilities.135  In addition, 
the proposed amendment strictly prohibited a BHC from holding more 
than 10% of the total deposits of all insured depository institutions.136 
In 2012, the amendment bill was modified and reintroduced 
under the title Safe, Accountable, Fair, and Efficient Banking Act 
(“SAFE Banking Act”).137  Regarding the concentration limit, the SAFE 
Banking Act amended section 622 by prohibiting a financial company 
from holding more than 10% of the total consolidated liabilities of all 
financial companies.138  The SAFE Banking Act thus essentially removed 
the exceptions from section 622.  Any financial company exceeding the 
limit would be forced to sell or otherwise transfer liabilities to unaffiliated 
firms.139 
The concentration limit under the Brown-Kaufman Amendment 
did not have the “organic growth” exception allowed under both section 
622 and the Riegle-Neal Act.140  Had the Brown-Kaufman Amendment 
been adopted, therefore, “three [banks]—Bank of America, Wells Fargo, 
and JPMorgan Chase . . . would have had to shed” their deposits in excess 
of the 10% cap.141  Such a measure may have seemed too drastic to most 
members of Congress. 
Another notable aspect of the Brown-Kaufman Amendment and 
the SAFE Banking Act was that, in addition to the deposit and liability 
cap, they both aimed to limit the non-deposit liabilities of financial 
134. Id. §§ 13(b), 620(f)(1).
135. Id. § 13(b).
136. Id. § 620(f)(1).
137. Safe, Accountable, Fair, and Efficient Banking Act of 2012, H.R. 5714, 112th Cong.
(2012). 
138. Id. § 3(b).
139. Id. § 3(c).  Another difference with the Brown-Kaufman Amendment was that the
leverage limit was changed so that bank holding companies with assets of $50 billion or 
greater and the nonbank financial companies supervised by the Fed are required to hold at 
least 10% of their total consolidated assets in tangible common equity.  Id. § 5A.  “Tangible 
common equity” is defined as qualifying common stockholders’ equity plus retained earnings. 
Id. § 2(a)(4). 
140. COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 48, at 9.
141. David M. Herszenhorn & Sewell Chan, Financial Debate Renews Scrutiny on
Banks’ Size, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2010) at A1. 
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institutions in terms of the percentage of GDP.142  It has been argued that 
such an approach, “a real cap on bank size,” could have an advantage of 
limiting not only the systemic risk but also the political power of large 
banks.143  Interestingly, the same approach has been advocated for by a 
Governor of the Fed, but on different grounds—it is simpler and has the 
advantage of limiting the size of financial firms to the economy’s 
“capacity to absorb losses.”144  This suggests that the debate over the 
Brown-Kaufman Amendment and the SAFE Banking Act may not be 
over yet. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 622 of Dodd-Frank limits the size of large financial 
institutions.145  It requires that the total liabilities of a financial company 
after a merger may not exceed 10% of the total liabilities of all financial 
companies in the U.S.146  Section 622 thus extends the existing 
nationwide deposit cap by expanding its coverage to non-deposit 
liabilities and non-bank financial institutions.147 
Yet section 622, as it stands now, does not seem to serve its 
purpose.  The bright-line rule—the characterizing feature that 
distinguishes section 622 from other similar Dodd-Frank provisions—is 
eaten up by the exceptions that give discretionary power back to the Fed.  
Attempts have been made to correct the problem, although they have not 
been successful so far. 
If section 622 does not do much, what should be done about it?  
The answer might be “nothing.”  This will be the case, for example, if 
one believes that financial mega mergers are not worrisome or the Fed 
will not allow such mergers when proposed.  Given that history has 
proven otherwise, such a belief seems rather unreasonable. 
Assuming that a change is necessary, what should be the direction 
142. S. Amend. 3733, 111th Cong. § 14(b)(1) (2010); H.R. 5714 § 5A(b)(1)(A).
143. E.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 219 (2010). 
144. Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. Stability Reg., Speech at the
Distinguished Jurist Lecture, Univ. of Penn. L. Sch., 23 (Oct. 10, 2012), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20121010a.htm. 
145. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
622, 12 U.S.C. § 1852 (2012). 
146. Id.
147. Id.
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of such a change?  A good start would be taking out the exceptions in 
section 622.  A more comprehensive reform—such as changing the 
measure of size or the coverage of the institutions—would require more 
elaborate analysis.  For this purpose, the Brown-Kaufman Amendment 
and the Safe Banking Act seem to be a natural starting point. 
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